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 A B S T R A C T  
This study investigates, firstly, the influence of family-controlled firm on corporate 
performance, and secondly, the influences of corporate governance mechanisms 
including control variable on corporate performance in the companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. By using five years (2009-2013) company data, this 
study used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to test the hypotheses. The 
results based on OLS, indicate that family controlled firms tend to have better per-
formance than non family controlled firms. Moreover, in regard to the link between 
governance variables and corporate performance, only managerial ownership exhi-
bits a positive relation with corporate performance, for both proxies, i.e. Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. Yet, the rests of governance variables (i.e. institutional ownership, audit 
committee, board of directors and independent board of commissioners) do not con-
firm the relationship with corporate performance. These findings have significant 
policy implications for the government, regulatory bodies, companies and other 
stakeholders including the investors in Indonesia to shape and implement an optim-
al governance system that can improve corporate performance.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini mencoba untuk menginvestigasi, (1) pengaruh perusahaan yang 
dikendalikan keluarga terhadap kinerja perusahaan, dan (2) pengaruh mekanisme-
mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan termasuk variabel kontrolnya terhadap kinerja 
perusahaan pada perusahaan-perusahaan yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia. 
Berbasis pada data perusahaan selama periode lima tahun (2009-2013), penelitian 
ini menggunakan regresi Ordinary Least Square (OLS) untuk menguji hipotesis-
hipotesis yang dikembangkan. Temuan dari hasil OLS mengindikasikan bahwa 
perusahaan yang dikendalikan keluarga mempunyai kinerja yang lebih baik diban-
dingkan dengan perusahaan yang tidak dikendalikan keluarga. Selanjutnya, terkait 
hubungan antara variabel-variabel tata kelola perusahaan dan kinerja perusahaan, 
hanya kepemilikan manajerial yang menunjukkan pengaruh positif terhadap kinerja 
perusahaan, baik yang diukur dengan Tobin’s Q maupun ROA. Sedangkan variabel 
mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan yang lain (yaitu kepemilikan institusional, ko-
mite audit, dewan direksi, dan dewan komiasaris indepen) tidak berhubungan den-
gan kinerja perusahaan. Temuan-temuan ini berimplikasi penting pada kebijakan 
pemerintah, badan pembuat peraturan, perusahaan dan pemangku kepentingan 
yang lainnya, termasuk para investor supaya bisa menguatkan dan mengimplemen-
tasikan sistem tata kelola perusahaan yang optimal supaya bisa meningkatkan ki-




Literature related to the link between family con-
trolled firms and their performance tries to under-
stand whether the existence of family members 
contributes to firm success in achieving its goals. 
For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argued 
that family firms tend to have better performance 
than non-family firms either measured by account-
ing or market basis. It indicated that active partici-
pation by family members in the governance struc-
ture of the company promotes better performance. 
Maury (2006) also stated that active participation 
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by family members in the family-controlled firms 
makes the firms have higher profitability than non-
family controlled firms. Another research by Chu 
(2011) found that the rise of family ownership trig-
gers firms to get better performance in Taiwan. Last 
of all, Martinez et al. (2007) evaluated the impact of 
family ownership on firm performance and found 
that the family-controlled firms have better perfor-
mance than the nonfamily controlled firms. 
Within the agency theory context, founding 
family ownership has an important role in reducing 
agency problems between managers and owners 
due to the interests of both parties move toward the 
same group of individuals (Fama &Jensen 1983; 
James 1999; McConaughy 2000). Generally, large 
shareholders tend to have stronger incentives and 
greater power to directly monitor managers' activi-
ties than the small shareholders by restraining the 
conventional agent problems between managers 
and shareholders. However, the concentrated own-
ership in the hands of large shareholders or block 
holders could also bring out another kind of agency 
problem between the controlling/majority share-
holders and non-controlling/minority shareholders 
that so-called type 2 of agency problem. Deep in-
volvement by family members in this relationship 
rises certain agency costs, such as nepotism, free 
riding, adverse selection, and so-forth (Schulze et 
al. 2003; Hadani 2007). 
To solve the above problems, the corporate go-
vernance, as significant monitoring mechanisms, 
should be implemented within the firm. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) explained that corporate gover-
nance is a set of mechanisms that can protect mi-
nority parties (outside investors) of expropriation 
carried out by managers and controlling sharehold-
ers (insider) with an emphasis on legal mechan-
isms. Moreover, Curveo (2002) argued that the ef-
fective implementation of governance mechanisms 
consisting of institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, audit committee, board of directors, 
and independent board of commissioners can miti-
gate those problems. In other word, fail implemen-
tation of those governance mechanism triggers to 
create a weak corporate governance system within 
the firm that causes the firm suffers with more 
agency problems. 
The weak corporate governance system is often 
referred as one of the causes of the financial crisis in 
Asian countries, including Indonesia, in 1997s 
(Johnson et al. 2000). Moreover, Johnson et al. 
(2000) documented that the corporate governance 
variables applied in a country better able to de-
scribe the extent of currency depreciation and de-
clining performance of capital markets in develop-
ing countries compared with macro economics va-
riables during the period of crisis. It means that the 
more effective the firm implements corporate go-
vernance system, the better firm performance. 
This study aims to empirically analyze the rela-
tion between family controlled firm, governance 
mechanisms, and performance of firms listed in 
The Indonesian Stock Exchange with size of the 
firm as a control variable. Indonesian firms can 
provide evidence to investigate each of agency 
problems due to: (1) Indonesia is a developing 
country where the level and quality of corporate 
governance and legal rules protecting both share-
holders and creditors are weak, (2) the majority of 
firms in Indonesian Stock Exchange exhibit highly 
concentrated ownership structures indicating the 
high existence of family firms (Claessens et al. 
2002). 
Considering the above discussion, this study is 
to examine firstly, the link between family-
controlled firm and corporate performance, and 
secondly, the influence of governance mechanisms 
including a control variable on corporate perfor-
mance. This study is expected to contribute to the 
body of literature on the link between family con-
trolled firm, governance mechanism and corporate 
performance, particularly in emerging market con-
text i.e. Indonesia. 
This study is organized into five sections with 
the introduction as the first section. Section 2 high-
lights the literature review and hypotheses devel-
opment and Section 3 provides details of research 
methodology. Section 4 elaborates on the empirical 
findings and discussion. Finally, Section 5 makes 
conclusions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Theoretical Framework 
The existing literature suggest that family deep 
involvement in the family firms makes the firms 
suffer with unique agency problems where the 
problems are no longer between principal and 
managers. However, it is more predominantly by 
the problems between controlling/majority share-
holders and non-controlling/minority shareholders 
(e.g. Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2003). 
Again, other studies found different results indicat-
ing that the existence of family members inside the 
firm governance structure can improve company 
performance when they can serve more effective 
control mechanism to the managers‟ activities. In 
this regard, Anderson and Reeb (2003) evaluated an 
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effect of family ownership on firm performance. 
Contrary to their perception, surprising result 
shows that family controlled firms have better per-
formance than non-family controlled firms. 
Both stream of research findings discussed 
above indicate that there are mix findings with re-
gard to the relationship between ownership con-
centration and firm performance. Many studies 
(e.g. Claessens et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2005) found a 
positive relation between concentrated ownership 
structure and firm value. Furthermore, similar find-
ings also document this positive relationship 
(McConaughy et al. 1998; Martinez et al. 2007; 
Maury 2006). However, several studies did not con-
firm a positive link between firm performance and 
ownership concentration (e.g. Demsetz & Lehn 
1985; Himmelberg et al. 1999, Demsetz & Villalonga 
2001). 
Since the findings from previous studies as 
discussed on the introduction section exhibit that 
family firms suffer with type 2 of agency problem 
between controlling and non-controlling share-
holders, this study also evaluates the relation be-
tween governance mechanisms (i.e. institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, audit commit-
tee, board of directors, and independent board of 
commissioners) as instruments to mitigate that 
problem and corporate performance by using firm 
size measured by the natural log of the book value 
of total assets as a control variable. 
 
Hypotheses 
Family Ownership and Corporate Performance 
The previous studies about the link between family 
ownership and firm performance have produced 
mixed results. Some researchers argue that large 
shareholders improve corporate performance due 
to the manager are better aligned with those of oth-
er shareholders (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; Isik 
& Soykan 2013). Accordingly, the desire of main-
taining a company in order to be passed on to the 
next family generations has led into long-term in-
vestment horizon (Demsetz 1983, James 1999). 
Moreover, Andres (2008) contended that family 
members usually have stronger power to supervise 
manager‟s activities than non-family members. 
Generally, family members will create a conducive 
working environment; therefore they can foster 
trust and loyalty from all employees (Ward 1988). 
In other word, with this more conducive working 
environment in family firms than non-family firms 
triggers better firm performance. However, Onder 
(2003) did not confirm such significant relation be-
tween ownership concentration by family and prof-
itability measured by ROA in Turkey. Moreover, 
Chen et al. (2005) concluded similar finding with 
Onder (2003) in Hongkong. 
Other researchers argued that the presence of 
family ownership can ultimately result in lower 
economic growth when the family controlled firms 
remain in hold their private benefits of control at 
the cost of minority shareholders (Shleifer &Vishny 
1997). Several researchers have already proved this 
hypothesis such Pervan et al. (2012) who found that 
ownership concentration influences negatively on 
company performance in Croatian listed firms. 
Again, Claessens et al. (2002) showed a similar 
finding when documented a link between family 
ownership and firm performance in Asia (including 
Indonesia). Considering above previous studies 
which generated mix findings on the relation be-
tween family ownership and corporate perfor-
mance, our first hypothesis is formulated as follow: 
H1 : The presence of family controlled firms have 
significant influence on firm performance. 
 
Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Perfor-
mance 
1. Institutional Ownership and Corporate Per-
formance 
With the growing volume of institutional share-
holdings, the companies are more likely to exploit 
their privilege rights on share‟s ownership to push 
down managers to serve the shareholders‟ interest 
by monitoring, disciplining, and influencing of cor-
porate managers (Cornett et al. 2007). Moreover, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) contended that large 
shareholders tend to hold more incentive in over-
seeing managers than other members of the board. 
Previous studies testing the link between insti-
tutional ownership and corporate performance 
have resulted mixed findings. Lowenstein (1991) as 
well as Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) did not 
confirm the correlation between institutional own-
ership and firm performance. Another study by 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found similar finding 
that institutional ownership does not correlate with 
firm performance. Again, Craswell et al. (1997) also 
documented that institutional ownership has no 
influence on corporate performance in Australian 
firms. In other hand, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
documented evidence consistently that the pres-
ence of institutional investors with more effective 
monitoring function causes managers put their 
resources to focus on corporate performance rather 
than on opportunistic behavior. Moreover, Brugg-
ren et al. (2007) found similar evidence that institu-
tional and foreign ownership have positive relation 
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with firm performance in Swedish listed firms. In 
other side, Charveddine and Elmarzougui (2010) 
found different finding where institutional owner-
ship has negative influence on firm performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q in the French listed firms. 
Based on all findings on previous studies at 
above, it could be understood that almost findings 
are consistent with the monitoring concept under 
agency theory where the existence of institutional 
investors play more effective monitoring function 
on managers‟ duties, thus the next hypothesis is 
formulated as: 
H2a : The presence of institutional ownership has 
positive influence on firm performance. 
 
2. Managerial Ownership and Corporate Perfor-
mance 
Several studies provide evidence that the interests 
of managers and shareholders are not always in-
line. Therefore, the rise of managerial ownership 
creates a condition that enables it‟s more capable to 
align the insiders‟ and other shareholders‟ interests. 
Nevertheless, when the proportion of managerial 
ownership gains a particular level, managers may 
get sufficient ownership level strengthening their 
own position regardless to decreasing firm value 
(Ruan et al. 2011). Accordingly, managers may ex-
ploit the opportunity to take over certain amount of 
corporate funds on their own interest by the ex-
pense of other shareholders. 
Generally, the presence of agency problems in 
emerging markets, including Indonesia, are more 
severe than those in developed market due to the 
lack of appropriate legal protection (LaPorta et al. 
1999; Wei et al. 2005). Demsetz (2003) argued that 
the growing volume of managerial ownership can 
be expected to result in reduced corporate perfor-
mance. Therefore, when insiders hold large voting 
right to pursue their own interest and exploit it to 
take over significant amount of corporate fund will 
not improve the corporate performance. 
Several previous studies have shown above 
expropriation hypothesis. Mork et al. (1988) found 
that firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q in-
crease up to 5% level of managerial ownership, 
then falls up to the 25% level. Similarly, McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) found the performance rises 
when insider ownership up to 37% level, and de-
creases when the managerial ownership on the 
level of 37% to 50%. Again, similar finding by 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) documented that corpo-
rate performance rises in the quadratic form up to 
58% level of managerial ownership. Mueller and 
Oener (2006) reported that the corporate perfor-
mance increases when managerial ownership up to 
80%, and when it reaches more than 80% the com-
pany performance decreases. 
The expropriations of corporate fund propor-
tional with the growing volume of managerial 
shareholdings tend to result a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm perfor-
mance. Wright et al. (2002) documented that mana-
gerial turnover and efficiency are lower in the firms 
with higher managerial ownership than the firms 
with more equal ownership structure between in-
siders and outsiders. Simonetic and Gregoric (2004) 
found a positive and significant relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance in 
Slovenian unlisted firms while they found insigni-
ficant relation on similar issue within Slovenian 
listed firms. Ruan et al. (2011) examined the influ-
ence of managerial ownership on firm performance 
through capital-structure choices. The findings do-
cumented a nonlinear relationship between mana-
gerial ownership and firm value. Palia and Lich-
tenberg (1999) found that the level of managerial 
ownership associates positively with productivity. 
Furthermore, the changes of productivity positively 
correlated with Tobin‟s Q as a proxy of corporate 
performance. Hu and Zhou (2008) examined a 
sample of non-listed firms in China and found that 
firms with greater managerial ownership have bet-
ter performance than those firms which managers 
do not own equity shares. This positive relation 
remains up to 50% level of managerial ownership 
and the relation becomes negative when the level of 
managerial ownership reaches more than 50%. 
Considering the findings of previous studies at 
above discussion, it could be concluded that the 
influence of managerial ownership on corporate 
performance is location specific. The relation is 
positive when the portion of managerial ownership 
is relatively low supporting incentive arguments. 
Nevertheless, such relation will be negative if the 
portion of managerial shareholding is relatively 
high strengthening entrenchment arguments. Based 
on our prior research on this issue (Suyono et al. 
2014), it could be concluded that managerial own-
ership in Indonesian listed firms is relatively low 
indicating closer support of incentive arguments, 
thus the following hypothesis is developed: 
H2b : The presence of managerial ownership posi-
tively influence on firm performance. 
 
3. Audit Committee and Corporate Performance 
The main function of an audit committee (hereaf-
ter AC) is monitoring and reviewing the account-
ing, audit and firm‟s financial reporting process 
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(Klein 2002). When AC can optimize its function, 
it will provide stakeholders a better quality of 
financial reporting and more likely to improve 
firm performance. Accordingly, it implies that a 
qualified, independent, and professional AC 
serves as a reliable guardian of public interest 
(Abbott et al. 2004). Moreover, Abbott et al. (2004) 
clarified that an AC involving of independent 
members with at least twice a year of meeting de-
creases the possibility of fraudulent reporting. 
Ultimately, this condition will improve the quality 
of the financial reporting process and market val-
ue. Similar finding by Kirkpatrick (2009) docu-
mented that independent members of AC contri-
bute to a higher market value. 
Some studies document that increased report-
ing quality contributes to better corporate perfor-
mance. Gompers et al. (2003) contended that AC 
contributes to a better firm performance by mitigat-
ing earnings management. Chan and Li (2008) note 
a positive influence of the independence of AC on 
firm performance. Moreover, Aldamen et al. (2012) 
compared the worst and best performing Austral-
ia‟s S&P300 firms and found that the size of AC 
positively influence on market performance. Based 
on the above discussion, the next hypothesis is: 
H2c : The size of audit committee positively influ-
ence on firm performance. 
 
4. Board of Directors and Corporate Performance 
The Board of directors (hereafter BOD) has a sig-
nificant role to guard an effective corporate go-
vernance practice, particularly for large firm 
where there is a separation of ownership and con-
trol, by mitigating agency conflicts within the 
firm. Boards can play crucial role in monitoring of 
management activities to reduce agency costs and 
maintain managerial accountability to achieve 
good performance (Eisenhardt 1989; Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997). However, when the board members 
are oversized, it makes its monitoring function 
less effective. Accordingly, a high number of 
board members may reduce their effort to maxim-
ize its function. Yermack (1996) proved this hypo-
thesis empirically by using a sample of U.S. firms 
and found that having small boards improves per-
formance. 
The previous studies about the link between 
board of directors and firm performance had mixed 
findings result. Chaganti et al. (1985) documented 
empirical evidence that successful firms tend to 
have bigger boards after they compared board size 
between failed and successful firms. However, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found no significant 
relationship between board composition and per-
formance. Fauzi and Locke (2012) analyzed the 
influence of various aspects of board composition 
on firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q and 
ROA. They found that all variables have a signifi-
cant effect on firms' financial performance meas-
ured by both proxies. 
There are some previous studies considering 
the number of board members as one of factors 
affecting firm performance though there is no one 
concluding certain number on the optimal board 
size (e.g. Prevost et al. 2002). In order to be effec-
tive, it is suggested that a board should have a max-
imum of seven or eight members (Jensen 1993). 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argued that large boards 
are less effective. Similarly, Yermack (1996) found 
negative correlation between board size and profit-
ability. Moreover, Eisenberg et al. (1998) also found 
that small size boards are positively related with 
firm performance. 
In other hand, Adams and Mehran (2003) did 
not confirm a negative relation between board size 
and firm performance in US banking companies. 
Surprisingly, they documented empirical evidence 
showing a positive relation between board size and 
banks‟ performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. Con-
sidering the above conflicting findings from prior 
studies, the next hypothesis is: 
H2d : The board size has significant influence on 
firm performance. 
 
5. Independent Board of Commissioners and 
Corporate Performance 
According to Indonesian context which runs two 
tier boards system, i.e. board of directors and board 
of commissioners, where the independent board of 
commissioners (hereafter IBC) is the Indonesian 
term for independent boards. Several prior studies 
have reported that the presence of such indepen-
dent party inside the firm can provide effective 
monitoring function on manager‟s activities and 
ultimately improve firm performance. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argued that the firm value will im-
prove when outside board of directors could optim-
ize its monitoring function on manager activities 
which can protect shareholder‟s interest. Beasley 
(1996) contended that independent directors hold 
better judgment and fair representation of share-
holders‟ interest, and ensure the maximization of 
shareholder value. 
Some researchers, such as Carter et al. (2003) 
believed that outside directors are better represent-
atives of shareholder‟s interests than inside direc-
tors. Therefore, several studies have found outside 
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directors relationship to be stronger with overall 
corporate performance (Pearce & Zahra 1992; Perry 
& Shivdasani 2005) and larger shareholder returns 
(Shivdasani & Yermack 1999). Beasley (1996) found 
that the firms having higher portion of outside di-
rector tend to have less fraudulent issues on their 
financial statements than firms with higher portion 
of inside directors. Moreover, Bhagat and Black 
(2002) documented that outside directors are more 
likely to be more effective in monitoring the beha-
vior of managers. 
Klein (1998) contended that the presence of 
outside directors on the board of directors will in-
crease shareholder returns as well as corporate per-
formance. Moreover, Chan and Li (2008) found 
evidence that the proportion of independent and 
expert members on boards of directors improves 
value of the firms. Again, Erickson et al. (2005) con-
tended that the presence of independent directors 
have greater power in mitigating agency problems 
between principal and managers as well as be-
tween controlling shareholders and non-controlling 
shareholders, so it increases firm performance. Si-
milarly, Ness et al. (2010) found the rise of inde-
pendent board number increases firm performance. 
Francis et al. (2012) found that the presence of out-
side directors who are less connected with current 
CEOs, positively related with firm performance 
measured by cumulative stock performance during 
financial crisis periods. However, another study by 
Horvath and Spirollari (2012) documented that the 
rise of outside directors decreases firm performance 
particularly during the financial crisis period. They 
argued that outside directors tend to implement 
more conservative business strategies in order to 
protect shareholders triggering the decrease of 
firm´s performance. 
Considering almost findings on the link be-
tween independent boards of director and firm 
performance on above discussion, the next hypo-
thesis is developed as: 
H2e : The proportion of independent board of 
commissioners positively influence on firm per-
formance. 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample of the Study 
The data used in this study are available on 
www.idx.co.id and/or on every company web-site. 
Applying the purposive sampling method, the fol-
lowing criteria are followed to carry out the sample 
selection from the population of 534 Indonesian 
listed companies for 2009-2013) periods as pre-
sented in Table 1. 
 
Regression Model 
This study used ordinary least squares (OLS) mod-
el to analyze the link between family controlled 
firm (FAM), corporate governance variables {i.e. 
institutional ownership (IO), managerial ownership 
(MO), audit committee (AC), board of directors 
(BOD), and independent board of commissioner 
(IBC)} along with control variable (i.e. firm 
size/SIZE) and corporate performance (CP). We 
formulate a regression model as follow: 
CP = α + β1FAM+ β2IO + β3MO + β4AC + β5BOD + 
β6IBC + β6SIZE + ε  (1) 
Before running the regression, this study per-
formed descriptive statistics and classical assump-
tion tests of regression consisting normality, auto-
correlation, heteroscedasticity and mulicollineari-
ty tests. Then it run the regression with two prox-
ies of corporate performance, i.e. Tobin‟s Q as a 
proxy of market based performance and return on 
assets (ROA) as a proxy of accounting based per-
formance. 
 
Variables Definition and Measurement 
1. Family Controlled Firm (X1) 
This study defines family controlled firm and non-
family controlled firm based on criteria developed 
by previous studies (e.g. Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Wang 2006; Suyono 2015) wherein the family con-
trolled firm is a firm having family ownership 
structure equal or more than 10% and non family 
controlled firm is a firm having family ownership 
structure less than 10%. Then It was encoded by 
dummy variable with 1 for family controlled firm 
and 0 for non-family controlled firm. 
Table 1 
Sample Selection with Purposive Sampling Method 
1. Listed companies in The Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2009 to 2013 periods. 534 
2. The delisted companies from IDX during the 2009 to 2013 periods. (40) 
3. Excluding financial companies (i.e., Insurance, Bank, etc) listed in IDX during the 2009 to 2013 periods. (91) 
4. Listed companies with uncompleted financial report during the 2009-2013 periods.  (291) 
 Total samples (number of firms) 112 
 Total samples for 5 years = 5 × 112 560 
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2. Corporate Governance 
In this study, the good corporate governance me-
chanism is proxied to the following factors: 
(i) Institutional Ownership (X2) 
Institutional ownership is a percentage of voting 
right by institutions in the company‟s outstanding 
stock (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Farooque et al. 2014). 
Therefore : 
Institutional Ownership = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑  𝑏𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 × 100%  (2) 
 
(ii) Managerial Ownership (X3) 
Managerial ownership is the number of sharehold-
ings held by the management who are actively in-
volved in the decision-making process over the 
total shares outstanding (e.g. Mueller and Oener 
2006; Farooque et al. 2014). Thus : 
Managerial Ownership = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑  𝑏𝑦  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 × 100%  (3) 
 
(iii) Audit Committee (X4) 
The audit committee is calculated based on the 
number of audit committee members (e.g. Aldamen 
et al. 2012; Suyono et al. 2014). 
 
(iv) Board of Directors (X5) 
The board of directors‟ is measured by the number 
of board of directors in the company (e.g. Yermack 
1996; Suyono et al. 2014). 
 
(v) Independent Board of Commissioners (X6) 
The independent board of commissioners‟ is meas-
ured by percentage of independent commissioners 
over the total number of commissioners, such on 
the following formula (Beasley 1996; Suyono et al. 
2014) : 
Independent Board of Commissioners = 
𝑇𝑕𝑒  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
 × 100% (4) 
 
3. Firm Size 
Firm size is measured by the natural log of the book 
value of total assets (e.g. Bhagat & Black 2002; An-
derson & Reeb 2003). 
 
4. Corporate Performance 
This study uses two proxies in measuring the cor-
porate performance, i.e. Tobin‟s Q and ROA. Tobin 
q developed by J Tobin is measured with formula 






   (5) 
Where : 
Tobin‟s Q = market based performance 
EMV = Equity market value 
EBV = Equity book value 
LBV = Liability book value. 
The return on assets (ROA) is a profitability ra-
tio measured by comparing net income to total as-
sets with formula as follow (Anderson & Reeb 
2003): 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  (6) 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics and Classical Assumptions 
of Regression 
Table 2 provides information about the characteris-
tics of the variables on final sample 112 companies 
or 560 firm years. Descriptive statistics shows rela-
tively high proportion of family controlled firm 
with mean value 49% in Indonesian listed firm. It 
also documents high institutional ownership while 
relatively low managerial ownership, with mean 
values, respectively, 52% and 11%. Average size of 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CP_ROA 560 .00 248.35 3.17 13.68 
IBC 560 .00 .66 .42 .15 
MO 560 .00 .56 .11 .14 
AC 560 2.00 5.00 3.18 .48 
BOD 560 2.00 11.00 4.47 2.00 
IO 560 .02 .98 .52 .31 
SIZE 560 21.81 33.60 28.16 1.90 
FAM 560 .00 1.00 .49 .50 
CP_TOBINSQ 560 -.31 2.87 1.10 .35 
Valid N (listwise) 560     
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the board of directors is 5, which is fairly small size 
ranging between 2 to 11 members, as well as the 
audit committee size is 3, ranging between 2 to 5 
members. However, the mean value of indepen-
dent board of commissioners is 42% indicating rela-
tively high independent members to the executives 
of the company. In regards to corporate perfor-
mance, both proxies (i.e. ROA and Tobin‟s Q) have 
the mean value 317% and 110% respectively. 
Then, this study run the classical assumption 
of regression1) for both models (i.e. with Tobin‟s Q 
and ROA as performance proxies). The normality 
test with asymp sig for both models are 0.230 and 
0.154 respectively, which are higher than 0.05. It 
means that all data on both models are normal. 
Again, The VIF and tolerance value for both models 
indicate no problem with multicollinearity. Moreo-
____________ 
 
1 This paper does not show the complete result here for brevity, 
but it will be available from the author if requested. 
ver, the results also show that heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation tests for both models met. 
 
Results of Regression Analysis 
Table 3 presents the relationship between corporate 
performances (CP) either measured by Tobin‟s Q or 
ROA as the dependent variable and the indepen-
dent variables consisting of family controlled firm 
(FAM) and corporate governance variables includ-
ing firm size as control. The finding reveals that 
FAM positively influences on CP either measured 
by Tobin‟s Q or ROA. Moreover, the evidence 
shows that only one governance variable, namely 
MO, has positive significant effect on CP as per 
expectation on both models. While other gover-
nance variables, i.e. IO, BOD, AC and IBC show no 
significant influence on CP either measured by To-
bin‟s Q and ROA. Therefore, H1 is accepted and H2 
is partly accepted only for MO, rejected for the rests 
(i.e. IO, BOD, AC and IBC). In regards to control 
variable, firm size (SIZE) has a significant positive 
Table 3 
Results of Regression Analysis for Both Models 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstd. Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .72 .24  2.98 .00 
IBC .06 .10 .03 .64 .52 
MO .14 .10 .06 2.38 .02 
AC -.05 .03 -.06 -1.44 .15 
BOD -.00 .01 -.04 -.84 .40 
IO -.05 .05 -.05 -1.09 .28 
SIZE .02 .01 .10 2.37 .02 
FAM .01 .03 .02 2.47 .04 




Unstd. Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 68.82 9.08  11.59 .00 
IBC 6.51 3.69 .07 1.77 .12 
MO .41 3.99 .00 2.14 .01 
AC -.28 1.18 -.01 -.28 .41 
BOD -.12 .29 -.02 -.42 .16 
IO -2.52 1.80 -.06 -1.39 .12 
SIZE -2.37 .30 -.33 -7.86 .00 
FAM 2.25 1.15 .08 4.95 .03 
a. Dependent Variable: CP_ROA 
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influence on CP measured by Tobin‟s Q and nega-
tive influence on CP measured by ROA. 
 
Discussion 
The first hypothesis relates to the link between fam-
ily controlled firm and corporate performance. The 
finding concludes that H1 is accepted for both cor-
porate performance proxies, i.e. Tobin‟s Q and 
ROA. This finding confirms the notion of agency 
theory which argues that founding family owner-
ship helps to mitigate agency problems between 
managers and owners due to similar groups of in-
dividual merge in firm‟s managerial position to 
achieve firm‟s goals. Therefore they can align their 
effort to promote firm success and ultimately im-
prove firm performance, either market based (i.e. 
Tobin‟s Q) or accounting based (ROA). This result 
is in-line with Anderson and Reeb (2003) who 
found that family firms tend to have better perfor-
mance than non-family controlled firms measured 
by both accounting (i.e. ROA) and market value 
basis (i.e. Tobin‟s Q) when family members actively 
involve in the governance structure of the firm. It 
also supports Maury (2006) who documented that 
active family controlled is associated with higher 
profitability compared to nonfamily controlled 
firms when the presence of family members within 
the firm board structure can create more conducive 
control environment. 
This study is also consistent with other pre-
vious studies such as: Ward (1988), Chen et al. 
(2005), Martinez et al. (2007), Andres (2008), Ibra-
him and Samad (2011) and Chu (2011) who found a 
positive relationship between family ownership 
and corporate performance. However, the finding 
on this study is not in-line with several studies 
which did not confirm a positive link between firm 
performance and ownership concentration (e.g. 
Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga 2001; 
Onder 2003; Chen et al. 2005; and Latif et al. 2014). 
The acceptance of first hypothesis provides empiri-
cal evidence in emerging market context, i.e. Indo-
nesia where the presence of family controlled firms 
are relatively high, i.e. 49 percent as discussed in 
the result of descriptive statistics on Table 2 at pre-
vious section, where the rise number of family 
members inside the firm can effectively improve 
corporate performance by curbing the agency prob-
lem between principal and managers. In other 
word, active involvement of family members in the 
firm creates more conducive working environment 
enabling managers to maximize firm‟s resources to 
achieve its goals. 
Yet, the second hypothesis relates to the rela-
tionship between governance variables (i.e. IO, MO, 
AC, BOD and IBC) and corporate performance. For 
those governance variables, only MO positively 
significant influence on corporate performance, 
while the rests have no significant influence on 
corporate performance. It could be concluded that 
the second hypothesis is partly accepted only for 
MO, indicating that other governance variables (i.e. 
IO, AC, BOD, and IBC) implemented in Indonesian 
listed firms still cannot optimize their main func-
tion to oversee managers‟ activities in order to util-
ize firm resources in achieving better performance 
rather than opportunistic behavior. With the partly 
acceptance of second hypothesis showing a positive 
influence of MO on corporate performance by us-
ing market based (Tobin‟s Q) and accounting based 
(ROA) performance supports the argument of 
agency theory stating that the rise of managerial 
ownership creates a condition that enables it more 
capable to align the interests of insiders and other 
shareholders. 
The alignment effect above enables managers 
to focus in using company resources to achieve 
firm‟s goals which ultimately improve firm per-
formance. This condition happens when the mana-
gerial ownership is on the relatively low level sup-
porting the “incentive argument” rather than “en-
trenchment” as in Indonesian listed firm with 11% 
mean value of MO. This finding is consistent with 
Mork et al. (1988) who found that firm performance 
measured with the Tobin‟s Q rises when insider 
ownership increases up to 5% and decreases on the 
higher level. Similarly, It is also consistent with 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) who found that firm 
performance rises when the level of insider owner-
ship reaches up to 37% and decreases when reaches 
higher level. 
Again, It is also in-line with Himmelberg et al. 
(1999), Mueller and Oener (2006), Ruan et al. (2011), 
Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) and Hu and Zhou 
(2008) who documented that the relation between 
firm performance and managerial ownership is 
positive on the relatively low level of insider own-
ership. However, the finding on this study is not 
consistent with prior studies which argued that the 
growing volume of managerial ownership can be 
expected to result in reduced corporate perfor-
mance (e.g. Demsetz 1983; Claessens et al. 2002; 
Wright et al. 2002; Simonetic & Gregoric 2004). It is 
because those studies were conducted in countries 
where the managerial ownership is relatively high, 
while in Indonesia such ownership is relatively 
low. 
The finding of IO on CP cannot confirm a sig-
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nificant relationship between both variables. This 
finding does not support the notion of agency 
theory which states that large ownership are more 
likely to use their ownership rights to give pressure 
on managers in order to act in the best interest of all 
shareholders (Cornett et al. 2007). It means that 
with relatively high level of IO in Indonesian listed 
firms still cannot optimize its function to monitor 
and pressure managers in order to act in-line with 
the shareholders‟ interests. However, the result is 
still consistent with several prior studies such as 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein 
(1991) who found no evidence that institutional 
ownership is correlated with firm performance. 
Moreover, it is also consistent with Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Craswell et al (1997) and Charved-
dine and Elmarzougui (2010) who failed to prove 
such significant relation. In other hand, the finding 
is not in-line with McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Cornett et al (2007), who documented a positive 
relation between institutional ownership and firm 
value measured by Tobin‟s Q. Again, it is not con-
sistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Bjugg-
ren et al (2007) who confirmed a positive relation 
between institutional ownership and firm perfor-
mance. 
The finding of AC on CP does not support the 
concept of agency theory, which argues that the 
existence of such committee is for monitoring func-
tion not only on firm financial performance but also 
on firm financial reporting. It means that the pres-
ence of audit committee in Indonesian listed firms 
still cannot optimize its function to monitor manag-
ers in order to act in the best interest of sharehold-
ers to improve firm financial performance as well 
as firm financial reporting. The optimum monitor-
ing function conducted by AC will prevent manag-
ers from opportunistic behavior such as hiding 
their fraud activities by presenting fraudulent fi-
nancial statements. Unfortunately, this ideal condi-
tion does not happen in Indonesian listed firms 
where the finding of descriptive statistics shows 
that the number of AC members has mean value 
relatively low, that is 3, ranging from 2 to 5 alarm-
ing that the presence of this committee only to 
comply with the regulations of the authorities in 
the capital market. Therefore, AC is powerless in 
front of managers to monitor and control their ac-
tivities and ultimately cannot improve corporate 
performance. This finding is not consistent with 
previous major studies on this issue in other coun-
tries which found a positive relationship between 
AC and CP (e.g. Klein 1998; Chan and Li 2008; Ab-
bott et al. 2004; Kirkpatrick 2009; Aldamen et al. 
2012). 
Again, the finding of board of directors on cor-
porate performance does not support the argument 
of agency theory explaining that board can play 
crucial role in monitoring of management activities 
to reduce agency costs and maintaining managerial 
accountability to achieve good performance (Eisen-
hardt 1989; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). It means that 
the presence of BOD in Indonesian listed firms with 
relatively small size (i.e. 5) as explained in descrip-
tive statistics section still cannot optimize its func-
tion in monitoring managers‟ activities. It also indi-
cates that the presence of BOD does not have strong 
power to run its function in reducing agency cost in 
the firms. However, this finding is consistent with 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) who found no sig-
nificant relationship between board number and 
performance. In other side this finding is not in 
accordance with several previous studies such as : 
Chaganti et al. (1985), Fauzi and Locke (2012), Pre-
vost et al. (2002), Adams and Mehran (2003) and 
Horvath and Spirollari (2012). 
Moreover, in regard to the link between IBC 
and CP, this study does not support the notion of 
agency theory arguing that outside board of direc-
tors could improve the firm value by monitoring 
services which can protect shareholder‟s interest. It 
means that the relatively high proportion of IBC 
(i.e. 42%) as explained in descriptive statistics sec-
tion within Indonesian listed firm still can not op-
timize its function particularly in monitoring of 
managers‟ activities and protecting shareholders‟ 
interests. It indicates that the level of independence 
of IBC members is very doubtful when they can not 
optimize their function to monitor managers. 
Therefore, IBC high proportion cannot corporate 
performance. This finding is not consistent with 
some researchers who believe that outside directors 
are better representatives of shareholder‟s interests 
than inside directors such as : Pearce and Zahra 
(1992), Perry and Shivdasani (2005), Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999), Beasley (1996), Bhagat and Black 
(2002), Klein (1998), Chan and Li (2008), Ness et al. 
(2010), Francis et al. (2012) and Horvath and Spirol-
lari (2012). 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
In general, it can be concluded as follows. The OLS 
regression analysis findings document that: (i) fam-
ily controlled firm has positive significant effect on 
improving corporate performance either with To-
bin‟s Q or ROA as expected (ii) unlike the expecta-
tion, only managerial ownership has positive sig-
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nificant influence on corporate performance, while 
the rests of governance variables do not have sig-
nificant influence on corporate performance neither 
for Tobin‟s Q nor ROA. 
Besides the above findings, this study has limi-
tations as it used only 112 companies from the total 
population of 534 (only 21%) companies. With this 
apparent data availability, this study contributes to 
the literature in the Indonesian context in identify-
ing the influence of family controlled firm on cor-
porate performance and governance mechanisms 
that is effective in improving corporate perfor-
mance (i.e. MO). More importantly, it reveals the 
fact that governance mechanisms (i.e. IO, AC, BOD 
and IBC) in Indonesian listed firm still cannot op-
timize their function. 
This study suggests that the existence of those 
mechanisms still merely comply with existing regu-
lations in the capital market thus do not have 
strong role in monitoring and pressuring managers 
in order to act in the best interest of all sharehold-
ers. The managerial implication from the results of 
this study is how the firm can maintain the family 
ownership on certain level where it can improve 
firm performance by aligning the interests of out-
side and inside shareholders. Moreover, it is very 
important to keep the MO in low level in order to 
convince that it presence supports incentive argu-
ment rather than entrenchment. It is also important 
to give stronger role for IO, AC, BOD, and IBC, so 
these governance mechanisms can optimize their 
main function and ultimately improve firm per-
formance. It is also suggested to all Indonesian 
listed firm to add the number of AC due to its li-
mited number, i.e. 3 indicating only to comply with 
Indonesian capital market regulations, thus AC still 
cannot optimize its function. Again, it is also very 
important to appoint the IBC members having high 
level of independence thus their presence are po-
werful in monitoring manager activities and pro-
tecting shareholders‟ interests. 
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